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 Abstract 
Many cases of externalities in agricultural production, such as pesticide drift, cross-
pollination, and offensive odors, are attributable to the incompatibility of neighboring 
land uses and exhibit distance dependence. We characterize equilibrium spatial patterns 
of externality-generating and -receiving land uses on a two-dimensional lattice with 
noncooperative, profit-maximizing producers. In equilibrium, generators or recipients 
form one or more neighborhoods with certain geometric properties, depending on how an 
externality dissipates with distance and whether there is an externality generated outside 
the region’s boundaries. Efficient land-use arrangements maximize social welfare subject 
to the implementability constraints stipulating that no farm-level activity, except for land 
use, can be directly controlled by the social planner. We characterize efficient land-use 
arrangements when the return to recipient land use decreases linearly with the length of 
the border shared with incompatible land uses. Under these assumptions, we find 
circumstances in which an efficient activity arrangement belongs to the set of the Nash 
equilibrium outcomes. Also, efficient arrangements in a more general case are discussed.  
 
Keywords: graph partitioning, land-use arrangement, spatial externality, supermodular 
game. 
 
  
EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENT LAND-USE ARRANGEMENTS UNDER 
SPATIAL EXTERNALITY ON A LATTICE 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, agricultural market analysts have paid increasingly more attention to 
the spatial concentration of production in both animal and crop agriculture. In general, 
geographic land-use patterns are shaped by a host of factors, including soil qualities, 
proximity to input markets, vertical integration, farm size, and marketing environment. 
We will focus on another feature of the grower’s decision environment: the presence of 
spatial externalities due to conflicting land uses.  
A number of externalities in agricultural production, such as pesticide drift, cross-
pollination, invasion by foreign species and predators, offensive odors, and animal waste 
pollution, are well documented. For example, Parker (2000) presents anecdotal evidence 
of spatial negative externalities in crop agriculture, including the damage to cotton crops 
due to herbicide applied on rice planted in the surrounding area, damage to olive crops 
produced near cotton, and conflicts among hybrid seed producers due to cross-
pollination. Recently, conflicts between growers of non-genetically modified (non-GM) 
and genetically modified (GM) varieties arising because of the possibility of cross-
pollination have become an important issue in crop agriculture (e.g., Jones 2003; Perkins 
2003; Belcher, Nolan, and Phillips 2003; Munro 2003; Brasher 2003).1 For economists, 
the case of incompatibility between organic and conventional growing practices on 
neighboring farms presents an almost ideal example of a negative spatial externality 
because of the identifiable costs associated with it (USDA n.d.).   
Parker and Munro (2004) develop econometric tests and find evidence that negative 
spatial externality is a significant economic factor weighing in on the location decision of 
certified organic farming operations in California.2 To be certified as organic, production 
must be deemed free from potential contamination by prohibited materials that are 
routinely used in conventional farming. When crops on the surrounding land are grown 
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using conventional farming practices, the quality of the organic crop is impaired because 
of the drift of prohibited chemicals or possible cross-pollination with GM crops. To avoid 
a contamination hazard emanating from the neighboring land uses, the organic producer 
is required to leave a buffer zone between the edge of his certified production site and the 
neighboring land use.3 The allocation of crop acreage to buffer zones lowers the 
profitability of a (organic) farming operation and presents a concrete and directly 
measurable cost of negative externality (e.g., Parker 2000; Munro 2003).4  
Palmquist, Roka, and Vukina (1997) and Herriges, Secchi, and Babcock (2003) 
provide empirical evidence on the presence of negative externalities in animal 
agriculture. They find that livestock feeding operations have greater negative impacts on 
the values of residential properties if they are located in the close vicinity. A number of 
other studies (e.g., Bockstael 1996; Geoghegan et al. 1996; Geoghegan, Wainger, and 
Bockstael 1997; and Irwin and Bockstael 2002) test for influences of surrounding land 
uses on property values and the probability of conversion of undeveloped land. They find 
that land values and conversion probabilities increase with the proportion of surrounding 
open space and pasture and decrease with the proportion of cropland and the length of 
incompatible edges. Positive externalities derived through spatial industry concentration 
in certain geographical areas are also well known (Fujita and Thisse 2002; Parker and 
Munro 2004). 
In all of these cases, the loss or gain from externalities is attributable to the incompati-
bility or complementarity of neighboring land uses and declines with the distance between 
the externality generator and recipient. From a policy perspective, this implies that 
restricting certain land uses to certain areas may control the total externality exposure. 
There exist a number of policies designed to improve the efficiency of land-use 
arrangements such as zoning orders, emission regulations, size restrictions, buffer zones, 
various environmental standards, and other types of legislation. In this light, it is interesting 
to examine when a desired assignment of certain land uses to certain areas can be sustained 
by noncooperative behavior without subsequent monitoring and enforcement.  
While there is growing empirical literature that analyzes the effect of distance-
dependent externalities on equilibrium and optimal spatial land-use patterns, there are only 
a few theoretical economic models that explicitly address this issue. The question of the 
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choice of a policy instrument to correct for externalities when the damages can be restricted 
to certain areas of the region is studied in Baumel and Oates (1988), Helfand and Rubin 
(1994), and Tomasi and Weise (1994) in different settings. The potential for 
nonconvexities in the aggregate production possibilities frontier and the alleviation of 
inefficiencies through the spatial separation of conflicting activities is noted in Baumel and 
Oates (1988). Helfand and Rubin (1994) investigate when it is socially efficient to spread 
or concentrate environmental damages but not in the context of multiple land sites operated 
by independent agents.5 They distinguish between three sources of nonconvexities that may 
arise in an externality-control problem: technical nonconvexity that occurs when additional 
units of pollution cause nonincreasing marginal harm to the environment (in our case, to 
farmers), psychological nonconvexity in social utility function, and production 
nonconvexity that occurs when the cost function exhibits increasing returns to scale. This 
paper can be viewed as providing micro-foundations that give rise to technical 
nonconvexities analyzed in Helfand and Rubin (1994). In their framework, the social 
planner allocates externality-generating production activity between the two sites, where 
site-specific environmental quality (externality) is an exogenous function of output. Here, 
we explicitly model how an “externality” forms and dissipates across multiple production 
sites (farms). Also, using a spatially continuous one-dimensional model (with atomless 
farms), Tomasi and Weise (1994) find circumstances when socially optimal intensity of 
externality-generating farming and the location of a boundary between farm and residential 
sectors can be achieved through spatial Pigovian taxes. While these papers address the 
issue of efficiency of land-use arrangements, they do so based on a highly stylized spatial 
structure that may not adequately capture the decision environment in crop agriculture.  
This paper provides two contributions to the literature. First, we formulate a model of 
land use (crop choice) under spatial externality and noncooperative behavior and examine 
equilibrium land-use arrangements. Following agent-based models of land use, price-taking 
producers are located on a two-dimensional regular tessellation (rectangular lattice or grid 
structure) where each farm is represented by a square cell.6 Second, we present a general 
formulation of the socially efficient land-use arrangement problem. It is assumed that the 
social planner has the ability to set output prices and assign land uses at the farm level but 
cannot control any other aspects of the environment including farm-level outputs or 
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production intensities on land in the assigned use. We characterize optimal spatial 
production patterns in environments possibly pertinent to the issue of coexistence of non-
GM (organic) and GM (conventional) crops. We also establish conditions when such 
arrangements are self-enforcing by independent, profit-maximizing producers conditional 
on the land-use-specific (but not location-specific) payment scheme.  
To allow for tractable analysis of land-use arrangements on a two-dimensional lattice 
with multiple sites, our model is simplified in a number of ways. All farms are identical 
except for location on a lattice, and the input and output prices are exogenous and 
invariant across locations. Thus, there is a single source of heterogeneity in equilibrium 
land use across agents—the difference in externality exposure from other agents. For 
concreteness, only generators impose an externality on others, and profit-maximizing, 
farm-level generator output is invariant to externality exposure. 
The critical assumption (1) is that the incremental return from switching land uses 
(recipient to generator) increases with the externality. This can be thought of as an 
(profit-driven) incentive to “conform” to neighboring land uses. Even with just two 
possible land uses, the framework encompasses a number of real-world situations where 
the externality can be negative or positive, as in the case of residential housing and open 
space. In principle, the model can be generalized to multiple activities, each of which 
generates an externality where the quantity of imposed externality is nondecreasing in the 
level of activity (e.g., see endnote 26). However, the primary application is to spatial 
arrangements of agricultural land uses, where the activity choice is dichotomous, in part, 
because of a minimum efficiency scale of an activity. For example, this includes the 
production of GM or non-GM crops, organic or conventional farming, and investment in 
a livestock feeding operation. And so, the terms “generator” and “recipient” are labels 
associated with “high” and “low” actions given that the agents’ payoff functions are 
supermodular in action and externality, that is, the incremental payoff from increasing the 
“level” of action is increasing in externality exposure from “higher” actions.7 This 
condition is the defining characteristic of “compatibility” among similar land uses. And 
so, for example, if homeowners are entitled to compensation from nearby animal feeding 
operations, only actions need to be appropriately relabeled. In that case, homeowners are 
generators and feeding operations are recipients of the externality. 
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To solve the welfare-maximization problem subject to the aforementioned imple-
mentability constraints, we make the following assumptions. (2) The externality is 
negative and affects only recipients. (3) The total (region-wide) recipient output and cost 
of production depend only on the aggregate loss due to the externality. (4) Individual 
recipient loss increases linearly with the externality. (5) The negative externality only 
affects neighbors that share a common border (and is proportional to the length of the 
border).8 Thus, by Assumptions 4 and 5, the recipient’s profit falls at a constant rate with 
the length of the border shared with land in externality-generating use. By Assumption 3, 
“spatial” efficiency of an arrangement is assessed based on the aggregate recipient 
(profit) loss conditional on output prices and the number of farms in each use. This 
objective is assuredly consistent with social welfare-maximization because, keeping 
prices, the number of generators, and farm-level generator output fixed, the aggregate 
recipient output is a decreasing function of that statistic. Note that, in general, the 
problem of cost minimization involves optimization over both locations and levels of 
production on each farm. However, the only farm-level intervention tool available to the 
planner is zoning regulation. 
In the first part of the paper, we characterize spatial properties of the (strict) Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies. Consistent with agent-based simulation models of land use 
under spatial externality (more to follow), there are multiple land-use patterns that 
constitute the Nash equilibrium. However, there are certain properties that are invariant to 
initial conditions and are present in any equilibrium land-use arrangement.9 The 
equilibrium properties of land-use patterns depend on how the externality dissipates over 
distance. We consider three cases of dissipation: (a) across a common border (i.e., 
Assumption 5 in the efficiency problem), (b) in a small neighborhood surrounding the 
generating use, and (c) across the entire region. In cases (a) and (b), we find that in the 
Nash equilibrium, externality-generating or -receiving farmers form one or more 
rectangular and octagon-shaped neighborhoods depending on whether land surrounding the 
region is in (permanent) externality-generating use. On the other hand, if the externality 
from any generator affects all farms in the region and its marginal impact decreases with 
distance (i.e., it dissipates “slowly” over the region), generators form a single convex-
shaped neighborhood. We also obtain a lower bound on the number of generators in the 
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Nash equilibrium where both crops are produced, which depends on the shape of the 
externality-dissipation function. A minimum number of generators (maximum number of 
recipients) assures that there is “enough” mutual externality imposed by generators on each 
other so that no generator has an incentive to switch to recipient use. 
In the second part of the paper, we formulate the problem of determining socially 
efficient land-use arrangements that comply with the technological constraints such as the 
scale of individual farms and the implementability constraints. Under Assumptions 2 and 
3, the problem can be decomposed into two stages. First, the number of farms in each use 
and the farm-level generator output (invariant across all generators) are exogenous, and 
arrangements that minimize the total externality exposure are determined. Second, given 
these arrangements, socially optimal outputs of each crop are established. Under 
Assumption 4, the first-stage problem belongs to the class of quadratic assignment 
problems (QAP). In a general case, QAP is a notoriously difficult combinatorial problem 
that has a number of diverse applications in many disciplines (e.g., Cela 1998).10 
Building on the geometric approach developed in Yackel, Meyer, and Christou 1997, we 
characterize efficient land-use arrangements under Assumptions 4 and 5. In efficient 
arrangements, generators and recipients occupy contiguous areas with the minimum 
border that separates the generator and recipient sites. The shape of the areas occupied by 
generator and recipient farms depends on the number of farms in each use.  
Based on this characterization, we find circumstances when an efficient arrangement is 
self-enforcing in the sense that it constitutes one of the strict Nash equilibrium outcomes of 
the land-use game. Assuming that all externality is generated within the region, this is 
somewhat more “probable” when the number of externality-generating farms is less than 
roughly three-fourths of the total number of farms in the region. If the share of generators is 
(approximately) less than one-fourth, efficiency requires that generators be arranged in a 
(almost) rectangular block located in a corner of the region. If the share of generators is 
between one-fourth and three-fourths, generators and recipients are arranged in (almost) 
rectangular blocks. Both of these patterns may coincide with the Nash equilibrium. In 
contrast, if the share of generators is greater than three-fourths, efficiency requires that 
recipients be arranged in a (almost) rectangular block located in a corner of the (square) 
region. This has zero probability of occurrence in the Nash equilibrium because it requires 
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that returns to both land uses for some farmers are precisely the same, so that any small 
change in the parameter values will alter the incentives.11 On the other hand, if land 
surrounding the region is in (permanent) externality-generating use, an efficient 
arrangement belongs to the set of equilibrium arrangements under a considerably wider 
range of circumstances. 
Also, through a series of simple examples we explain why both assumptions (the 
linearity of the recipient’s profit loss and “border” externality) underpinning the analysis 
in the benchmark case are necessary for our results. If the recipient’s returns to farming 
decrease nonlinearly with the extent of exposure, spatial concentration of generators or 
recipients may not be optimal since it leads to a skewed distribution of exposures among 
recipients. Upon dispensing with Assumption 5 and letting the externality extend its 
impact beyond neighbors with a common border, it is also no longer the case that 
efficiency involves all generators “agglomerated” in one location in the region. This is 
because a contiguous area allocated to generator use may necessitate locating some 
generators “close” to the middle of the region, which may increase exposure for the 
remaining recipient sites. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The remainder of Section 1 offers a 
brief review of the related literature. A model is formulated in Section 2. In Section 3, 
equilibrium arrangements are characterized. In Section 4, we determine socially optimal 
arrangements in an environment reminiscent of non-GM and GM crop production and 
investigate conditions for compatibility between efficiency and non-cooperative 
equilibrium. Efficient arrangements in a more general case are also discussed. 
Conclusions are given in Section 5. 
1.1 Literature Review 
The modeling of agricultural land-use decision-making frequently employs agent-
based models (see Parker et al. 2003 or Janssen 2004 for a review of agent-based 
models). The main ingredients of agent-based models are the landscape, a rectangular 
array of (equal-sized) cells that cover the land area; agents, the landowners who make 
land-use decisions within their cells, and the specification of the agent’s behavior and the 
decision-making process. These complex systems routinely have multiple equilibria and 
are highly path dependent in the sense that the predicted spatial land-use pattern is very 
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sensitive to subtle differences in the decision-making environment or initial distribution 
(Brown et al. 2004; Parker 2000; Belcher, Nolan, and Phillips 2003).  
Using this kind of a cellular automaton model, Parker (2000) analyzes land-use 
patterns that may arise as a result of noncooperative profit-maximizing behavior by 
producers who choose between externality-generating (conventional) and externality-
receiving (organic) farming under Assumptions 2 through 5. Parker (2000) gauges the 
effects of initial conditions and geographic features of the region on the social efficiency 
of final (equilibrium) arrangements and discusses Pareto-improving rearrangements. 
However, as the author points out, neither noncooperative nor optimal land-use 
arrangements have received a conclusive treatment. Also, the question of when optimal 
arrangements can emerge or be sustained in a noncooperative equilibrium needs more 
thorough scrutiny.12 
Some notable exceptions to this methodology of modeling spatial land-use patterns 
are recent contributions in the urban economics and location theory literatures (for a 
review, see Kanemoto 1987) such as Page 1999 and Turner 2004. These authors use a 
game-theoretic approach (as well as computer simulations) to analyze the process of city 
formation through the choice of residential location in the presence of spatial 
externalities.13 In Page 1999, agents decide where to reside on a lattice based on the 
proximity to other agents and separation (preference for open space) in the environment 
where multiple residents may reside in the same location. Turner (2004) considers the 
choice of residential location in a one-dimensional city, which limits the patterns of 
spatial interactions that are of interest in the present inquiry.14 
Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2004) use a model that shares many features with ours 
to study the role of social networks in promoting criminal activities, and explore the 
endogenous formation of a criminal network. In their framework, affiliated criminals 
impose a positive externality on each other by sharing ‘trade secrets’ but compete in 
criminal activities. They analyze a two-stage game where individuals first decide to work 
or become criminal (this is analogous to an externality-generating or receiving land-use 
decision in our model) and then the crime-effort provided if criminals. For simplicity, in 
our model the second stage, where equilibrium amounts of production on each farm are 
determined, is degenerate because we assume that output prices are exogenous. While 
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Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2004) consider arbitrary or endogenous networks (spatial 
structures positing relations among agents), we analyze geometric equilibrium patterns 
within a fixed spatial structure (rectangular lattice). Also, the focus of inquiries is 
different. Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2004) emphasize the multiplicity of equilibria 
with different number of active criminals and crime levels that are driven by the 
geometry of the pattern of links among agents, while we are interested in the 
compatibility between noncooperative and efficient arrangements.  
 
2. Model 
2.1 Spatial Structure 
Let },...,1{ 2nN =  denote the set of farms (convex and non-overlapping plots of 
land) or agents located on an nn×  lattice (region) with farm indices starting in the left-
lower corner and going from the left to the right of each row, 3≥n . The horizontal and 
vertical coordinates (row and column) of farm (cell) i  are given by ]/)1[(1 niyi −+=  
and ixi = )1( −− iyn , where ][b  denotes the integer part of b . To each lattice point 
),( ii yx  is associated a closed unit square (called farm i ) centered at ),( ii yx . The 
distance between two farms i  and j  is measured using Euclidean metrics: ijd  
2)[( ji xx −= 2/12 ])( ji yy −+ . For example, in Figure 1, the region consists of nine farms, 
3=n ;  farm 7 has coordinates )3,1(),( 77 =yx , and the distance between farm 7 and farm 
2 is equal to 527 =d .  
2.2 Spatial Externality 
Each agent operates one farm, and all farms are identical in all aspects except for 
location. Each farm i  produces one of the two crops: the externality “recipient” crop, ir ,  
 
5 6
2 3
4
1
987
 
FIGURE 1. Two-dimensional lattice and farm indices 
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or the externality “generator” crop, ig . At the farm level, the externality imposed by farm 
j  on farm i  is given by ),()( jjij rgzdγ , where 0(.) ≥γ  is the externality dissipation 
function.15 For concreteness, we take jjj grgz =),( , if 0>jg  and 0),( =jj rgz  if 0>jr , 
that is, the externality increases linearly with generator output, and recipients do not  
generate an externality of any kind. The impact of the externality decreases with distance 
between the farm plots and may become zero if farms are sufficiently far apart, 
0)()()( ≤−+=∆ ddd γεγγ  for any )2)1(,1[ −∈ nd  and 0>ε . The total amount of 
the externality imposed on farm i  is then given by16  
 ∑ ≠= ij jiji gde )(γ . (1) 
In the analysis to follow, we will make several assumptions regarding the properties 
of the externality diffusion (dissipation) function, γ . Specifically, we consider 
production environments where the externality affects recipient neighbors that (a) share a 
common border with the generator, 11)( ≤= ddγ ; (b) belong to a local neighborhood of the 
generator, 21)( ≤= ddγ ; and (c) are located anywhere in the region, 0)( ≥dγ  for 
]2)1(,1[ −∈ nd . Case (c) may pertain when, for example, contamination through cross-
pollination by GM material may occur at distances that exceed farm width. Also, in the 
case of hog confinements and residential properties affected by odor and noise, there may 
exist additional risks of accidental hog waste pollution in a wider area. 
Unless stated otherwise, we assume that the externalities present in the region are 
generated within the region so that (1) holds for all farms, including those located along 
the region’s boundaries. The case when land surrounding the region is allocated to a 
“permanent” externality-generating use will be considered in cases (a) and (b). Note 
that the assumption that there is no externality generated outside the region’s 
boundaries is more natural and emphasizes the endogeneity of “locations” of the 
externality-generating farms.17  
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2.3 Agents’ Payoffs 
The maximized profit from growing recipient, r , and generator, g , crops for farmer 
i  is 
 ),(max)( iqqqiq eqcqpe −=π ,  (2) 
where grq ,= , output prices rp  and gp  are taken as given by individual producers, and 
rc  and gc  are increasing and convex cost functions of outputs r  and g . For later use, let 
),(** rii perr =  and ),(** gii pegg =  denote profit-maximizing outputs of recipient and 
generator crops conditional on output prices and the externality exposure. 
 
ASSUMPTION 1. (a) ee gr ∂∂<∂∂ // ππ  and (b) 0/2 =∂∂∂ gecg  for all 0, ≥ge . 
 
Condition (a) states that the marginal gain (loss) due to the externality for a recipient 
producer is smaller than that for a generator, or equivalently, the incremental return of 
switching from the recipient to the generator crop, )()( ee rg ππ − , increases with 
externality. It is consistent with the parable of conflicting (or compatible) land uses since 
land uses of the same type typically impose less mutual damage relative to incompatible 
uses or even provide mutual benefits (positive externality). For example, condition (a) is 
satisfied if 0/)( <∂∂ eerπ  and 0/)( ≥∂∂ eegπ , which is characteristic of conflicts 
between organic (recipient) and conventional (generator) farmers. The option to grow the 
generator crop effectively puts a cap on the losses from the externality exposure accrued 
when land is in the recipient use. On the other hand, condition (a) is satisfied if 
<∂∂≤ eer /)(0 π eeg ∂∂ /)(π , which is consistent with a positive externality imposed by 
pasture on the value of nearby houses. Informally, allocating a vacant tract of land to 
pasture is more profitable relative to housing when there is “too much” open space and 
pasture surrounding it. Condition (a) is crucial in forming equilibrium land-use patterns, 
and implies that the recipient’s loss (generator’s gain) due to the externality exceeds that 
for the generator (recipient) once the externality exceeds a certain threshold. 
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Condition (b) assures that the profit-maximizing output of the generator crop is 
invariant across all generators, ** ggi = . It is adopted primarily for ease of exposition. If 
generator output depends on neighboring land uses, equilibrium production patterns are 
more difficult to ascertain. In that case, externality exposure, ie , is no longer a linear-
additive function of the number and location of generators (see equation [1]), since each 
generator output, *jg , depends on the other (distance-weighted) generator outputs.  
Furthermore, for simplicity, we assume that the region where farms are located is 
small and that output prices, rp  and gp , are determined outside the region. Also, for 
convenience, we normalize the optimal output of the generator crop, *g , to equal 1.  
 
3. Crop-Choice Game and Equilibrium Arrangements 
In this section we study spatial arrangements of production activities under the 
assumption that farmers act noncooperatively. In other words, there is no coordination 
among farmers and each farmer chooses what crop to grow taking the choices of others 
as given (i.e., a simultaneous-move game). Let ),...,( 21 nggg =
G  denote the profile of 
generator crop farms in the region and ),...,,,...,( 2111 niii ggggg +−− =  denote the profile of 
generator crop farms for all farms but farm i . Each farmer i  makes her production 
decision, }1,0{∈ig , (chooses the best response) in accordance with 
 ))(())(()1(),(max }1,0{ i
g
ii
r
iiig geggegggi −−−∈ +−= πππ .  (3) 
Denote this crop choice (production decision) game by )(γΓ . An important property of 
the individual farmer payoff (3) is supermodularity in ),( ji gg  for any ij ≠ : 
),( iigg ggji −∆∆ π 0≥ , which follows by Assumption 1. As a consequence, )(γΓ  belongs 
to the class of supermodular games studied in Milgrom and Roberts (1990).18 
We look for Nash equilibria in pure strategies of the crop choice game.19 The (strict) 
pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) is defined by a profile of crop choices in the 
region, *gG , such that for any farmer, Ni∈ , ),()(),( *** iii gggg −− >≥ ππ  for *igg ≠ , 
}1,0{∈g . Since )(γΓ  is a supermodular game, PSNE is known to exist. Observe that 
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either )0()0( gr ππ ≥  holds and the crop choice profile )0,...,0(* =gG , constitutes the 
PSNE, or )0()0( gr ππ <  holds and )1,...,1(* =gG  is the PSNE (furthermore, this is the 
only possible Nash equilibrium). We are interested in studying spatial arrangements 
where both crops are produced, which is equivalent to the existence of a profile *gG  such 
that (see equation [3])20 
 )()( i
g
i
r ee ππ ≥  and )()( jrjg ee ππ ≥  for all Nji ∈,  with 0* =ig  and 1* =jg . (4) 
The following result establishes an essential property of equilibrium arrangements. Let 
∑= i iggs )( G . 
 
LEMMA 1. In any PSNE with 2* )(0 ngs << G , we have ji eee ≤≤ ˆ  for all Nji ∈,  with 
0* =ig  and 1* =jg , where eˆ  is a unique solution of equation )()( ee gr ππ = . 
 
Proof. Note that (4) implies that )()(0)()( j
g
j
r
i
g
i
r eeee ππππ −≥≥−  for any Nji ∈,  
with 0* =ig  and 1* =jg . Because by condition (a) in Assumption 1, )()( ee gr ππ −  is 
(strictly) decreasing in e  and 0)ˆ()ˆ( =− ee gr ππ , it follows that ji eee ≤≤ ˆ . 
 
By Lemma 1, a necessary condition for (4) to hold is that the externality exposure for any 
recipient is less than that for any generator, that is, for any externality less than eˆ  the 
recipient’s profit is greater than the generator’s profit, while the converse holds for any 
ee ˆ≥ . For example, if 0/ >∂∂ ecr  and 0/ =∂∂ ecg  so that 0/ <∂∂ erπ  and 
0/ =∂∂ egπ , in any equilibrium where both crops are produced, externality-receiving 
(organic) farmers earn greater profits than externality-generating (conventional) farmers.  
Note that, in general, the total output of the recipient crop depends not only on the 
number of farms engaged in the recipient crop production but also on the spatial 
arrangement of externality-generating and -receiving farms in the region. This will not 
play a role in our analysis because output prices are exogenous (“small” region). In 
addition, since, by Assumption 1(b), output is invariant across generator farms, the focus 
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is on the characterizations of spatial arrangements of land uses that are undifferentiated 
by production intensity. In the following sections, we study equilibrium land-use patterns 
by noncooperative producers under several alternative assumptions about the shape of the 
externality-dissipation function.  
3.1 Local Externality with Four-Neighbor Impact 
In this section we consider the case when the externality impacts only the neighbors 
on the immediate border: 1)( =dγ  if 1≤d , and 0)( =dγ  if 1>d . The localized impact 
of the externality suggests that a plural number of neighborhoods that consist of farms 
with similar (compatible) land uses may exist in equilibrium, because farms that are not 
in the immediate vicinity of each other are effectively independent in terms of externality 
exposure.21 Proofs are provided in the Appendix. 
 
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and 11)( ≤= ddγ . Then in any PSNE, 
 (i) 0)( * =gs G  if 2ˆ >e ;  
 (ii) either 0)( * =gs G  or 2* )( ngs =G  or nngs −≤≤ 2* )(4 G  and generators are 
arranged in rectangular neighborhoods with dimensions 22 ×  or more if 2ˆ1 << e ; 
 (iii) either 0)( * =gs G  or 2* )( ngs =G  if 1ˆ0 <≤ e . 
 
If )1()1( gr ππ =  (or )2()2( gr ππ = ) so that producers who have one (or two) 
generator neighbors are exactly indifferent between either activity, other equilibrium 
patterns of spatial arrangements exist. However, the probability of any such equilibrium 
has zero measure since any arbitrarily small perturbation of parameters (e.g., gp  or rp ) 
will alter producer incentives and result in an equilibrium characterized in cases (i) – (iii) 
in Proposition 1. 
No externality-generating crop is produced in equilibrium if )2()2( rg ππ < . This 
follows by induction because farms along the edge of the region have a smaller number 
of neighbors with common borders (within the region) which always provides them with 
an incentive to switch to a recipient use. An example of PSNE where both crops are 
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produced is presented in Figure 2a, where it is assumed that 2ˆ1 ≤≤ e  so that, by 
Assumption 1(a), )()( ee gr ππ ≥  for }1,0{∈e  and )()( ee gr ππ ≤  for }4,3,2{∈e . In 
Figure 2a, there are two neighborhoods of externality-generating farms (gray and dotted 
gray cells) that earn profit )2(gπ  and )3(gπ . The profit for recipient farms in light-gray 
cells is )1(rπ  because they share a border with a generator. The profit for recipient farms 
in white cells is )0(rπ  because none of their “border” neighbors are generators.22 
In the case when land outside the region is allocated to externality-generating use (as 
illustrated in Figure 2b where dark gray cells represent “permanent” generators), the 
analog to Proposition 1 can be easily proved in the same manner (so the proof is omitted). 
Note that in this case, recipients form neighborhoods. 
 
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and 11)( ≤= ddγ , ∑ ≠ ≤+= ij jdi ge ij 111  
for =i 2,..., n-1, n+1,..., n2-2n+1, 2n,..., nn −2 , 1,...,2 22 −+− nnn , and 2=ie  
∑ ≠ ≤+ ij jd gij 11  for ni ,1= , nn −2  1+ , 2n . Then in any PSNE,  
 (i) either 0)( * =gs G  or 2* )( ngs =G  if 4ˆ3 ≤< e ;   
 (ii) either 0)( * =gs G  or 2* )( ngs =G  or 4)( 2* −≤≤ ngsn G  and recipients are 
arranged in rectangular neighborhoods with dimensions 22 ×  or more if 3ˆ2 << e ;23  
 (iii) ngs =)( *G  if 2ˆ <e . 
 
Suppose that the externality’s impact on recipients is negative, 0/ <∂∂ erπ . 
Propositions 1 and 2 provide a sense in which in equilibrium recipients “stay away” from 
generators when the edges of the region provide “protection” from the externality, while  
 
 
recipient: )1(rπ  
generator: )2(gπ
recipient: )0(rπ
generator: )3(gπ
 
recipient: )1(rπ
generator: )4(gπ
recipient: )0(rπ  
recipient: )2(rπ  
generator: )3(gπ
 
(a) Region with “protected” borders, 2ˆ1 ≤≤ e  (b) “Unprotected” borders, 3ˆ2 ≤≤ e  
FIGURE 2. Equilibrium arrangements: 11)( ≤= ddγ , 7=n  
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they “get closer together” when there are “permanent” generators outside the region (see 
Figure 2). If the externality is positive, 0/ ≥∂∂ erπ , the interpretation is that generators 
“get closer together” when there are no “permanent” generators outside the region, and 
they “stay away” from relatively less “beneficial” recipients when the region is 
surrounded by generators.  
3.2 Local Externality with Eight-Neighbor Impact  
In this section, we consider the case when the externality impacts neighbors located 
within an eight-farm neighborhood surrounding a generator, 1)( =dγ  if 2≤d , and 
0)( =dγ  if 2>d . We will refer to an (irregular) octagon-shaped neighborhood 
determined by the intersection of parallel vertical, horizontal, and diagonal lines (passing 
through the centers of cells) as an octagon neighborhood, given that the length of each 
side of the smallest octagon containing all farms (cells) in the neighborhood is at least 
2  (see Figure 3). 
 
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and 21)( ≤= ddγ . Then in any PSNE, 
 (i) 0)( * =gs G  if eˆ4 < ;   
 (ii) either 0)( * =gs G  or 2* )( ngs =G  or ≤≤ )(12 *gs G 42 −n  and generators are 
arranged in octagon neighborhoods, if 4ˆ3 << e ; 
 (iii) either 0)( * =gs G  or 2* )( ngs =G  or kgs 4)( * =G , where 2)3/(1 nroundk ≤≤ , and 
generators are arranged in 22 ×  squares if eˆ2 ≤ 3< ;24 
 (iv) either 0)( * =gs G  or 2* )( ngs =G  if 2ˆ0 <≤ e . 
 
recipient: )1(rπ  
generator: gπ  
recipient: )0(rπ  
recipient: )2(rπ  
recipient: )3(rπ  
 
 
 
recipient: )1(rπ  
generator: gπ  
recipient: )0(rπ  
recipient: )3(rπ  
recipient: )4(rπ  
(a) Region with “protected” borders, 4ˆ3 ≤≤ e   (b) “Unprotected” borders, 5ˆ4 ≤≤ e  
FIGURE 3. Octagon-shaped neighborhoods with 21)( ≤= ddγ , 11=n  
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To prove Proposition 3, we take into account that farms located at the edge of the 
region have fewer neighbors than farms in the middle of the region. The limited number 
of possible local configurations implied by the rectangular grid structure has an 
immediate consequence for the shape of equilibrium generator neighborhoods. However, 
if )4()4( gr ππ =  or )3()3( gr ππ = , other (unstable and unlikely) equilibrium patterns of 
land uses exist. An example of PSNE where both crops are produced is presented in 
Figure 3a, where it is assumed that 4ˆ3 ≤≤ e  so that, by Assumption 1(a), )()( ee gr ππ ≥  
for }3,...,0{∈e  and )()( ee gr ππ ≤  for }8,...,4{∈e . To simplify the diagrams in Figure 3, 
generators are represented by gray color independent of the profit (the number of 
generator neighbors). In Figure 3a, there are two octagon-shaped neighborhoods of 
generators (gray cells) that earn )(egπ , where 4≥e  (therefore, they have no incentive to 
switch). Recipient farms in dotted gray (light gray, dotted white, and white) cells earn 
)3(rπ  ( )2(rπ , )1(rπ , and )0(rπ ) because they have three (two, one, and zero) neighbors 
within a 2  radius that are generators. 
The following result demonstrates that when the region is surrounded by land in 
externality-generating use, the equilibrium land-use patterns are “inverted” so that 
recipients form neighborhoods in PSNE where both crops are produced (see Figure 3b). 
This is a counterpart to Proposition 3, and so the proof is omitted. 
 
PROPOSITION 4. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and 21)( ≤= ddγ , ∑ ≠ ≤+= ij jdi ge ij 113  
for =i 2,..., n-1, n+1,..., n2-2n+1, 2n,..., nn −2 , 1,...,2 22 −+− nnn , and 5=ie  
∑ ≠ ≤+ ij jd gij 11  for ,1,,1 2 +−= nnni  2n . Then in any PSNE, 
 (i) 0)( * =gs G  if 8ˆ6 ≤< e ;   
 (ii) either 0)( * =gs G  or 2* )( ngs =G  or =)( *gs G kn 42 −  where k≤1 2)3/(nround≤ , 
and recipients are arranged in 22 ×  squares if <5 ≤eˆ 6 ; 
 (iii) either 0)( * =gs G  or 2* )( ngs =G  or )(4 *gs G≤ 122 −≤ n , and recipients are 
arranged in octagon neighborhoods if 5ˆ4 << e ; 
 (iv) 2* )( ngs =G  if 4ˆ <e . 
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The intuition behind Propositions 3 and 4 is analogous to that for Propositions 1 and 2. 
Together, these results demonstrate that equilibrium land-use patterns depend on the 
nature of externality dissipation in the spatial dimension. In some agricultural contexts, 
externality does not dissipate completely beyond the immediate neighbors but extends 
some of its impact across a larger area or possibly the entire (small) region. The 
equilibrium land-use arrangements in these cases are investigated next. 
3.3 Global Externality  
In this section we examine some properties of noncooperative equilibrium spatial 
arrangements when the externality is not local. First, we derive a lower bound on the 
number of generators in any PSNE, which turns out to depend on the curvature of the 
externality dissipation function. Then we provide a geometric characterization of 
equilibrium land-use patterns when the externality’s impact declines by more as the 
distance between a source and receiver increases (i.e., the dissipation function is globally 
concave). For concreteness, we hold that the externality is only generated by farms within 
the region. 
Lower Bounds on Equilibrium Number of Generators. The following result 
formalizes the intuition that in equilibrium where both crops are produced, the number of 
generators is sufficient to assure that there is “enough” mutual externality exposure 
among generators, so that no generator has a unilateral incentive to switch to recipient 
land use (which is more profitable in the absence of other generators).  
 
PROPOSITION 5. Let Assumption 1 hold. In any PSNE either 0)( * =gs G  or ≥)( *gs G  
)]2()1(/[)1(1 γγγ −+  if 0)(2 ≥∆ dγ  or ≥)( *gs G )12)1((/[)1(1 −−+ nγγ  
)]2)1(( −− nγ  if 0)(2 ≤∆ dγ  for all )2)1(,1[ −∈ nd . 
 
The tightness of the lower bound on the equilibrium share of generator farms depends 
on the attributes of the externality dissipation function such as concavity or convexity. The 
following example illustrates how the lower bound is used to restrict the set of candidate 
equilibrium arrangements when the externality-dissipation function is linear.  
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EXAMPLE 1. Consider a linear case of externality diffusion-decay: dnd −−= 2)1()(γ  
so that 0)( >dγ , 0)( <∆ dγ , and 0)(2 =∆ dγ  for all )2)1(,1[ −∈ nd . From 
Proposition 5, we obtain a lower bound on the equilibrium number of generators: ≥)(gs G  
2)1( −n . Using this bound, we can immediately rule out spatial arrangement in Figure 
4a, where 4)( =gs G  and 4=n , as a candidate for PSNE because 234 < . However, it is 
easy to check that the arrangement in Figure 4b constitutes PSNE with 9)( * =gs G  given 
that 2.19ˆ6.18 ≤≤ e  where )ˆ()ˆ( ee gr ππ = . 
 
Concavity of Externality-Dissipation Function and Convexity of Generator Neighbor-
hood. To further characterize possible equilibrium arrangements, we assume that the 
externality exposure decreases by more as the distance between farms increases: 
0)(2 ≤∆ dγ  for all ]2)1(,1[ −∈ nd . Note that this assumption implies that 0)( >dγ  for 
any )2)1(,1[ −∈ nd , and if 0)( =dγ  then 2)1( −= nd . In other words, the 
externality exhibits a “slow” diffusion-decay in the spatial dimension so that each 
generating unit is “felt” throughout the entire region by each farm. We will need the 
following definition. 
 
DEFINITION 1. An eight-connected neighborhood }|),{( NiyxL ii ∈⊂  is said to be 
discretely (digitally) convex if no point (farm center) outside of L  lies in the convex 
hull of L .25 
 
It can be shown that this attribute is equivalent to the following properties (Chauhuri and 
Rosenfeld 1998). First, there exists no triple of collinear (real) points such that the first and 
last ones lie in L  and the middle one lies outside of L . Second, the line segment joining is  
 
(a) 
 
 (b) 
 
 (c) 
 
 
 generator
recipient
 
FIGURE 4. Arrangements under global externality, 4=n  
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any two farms in L  lies everywhere “near” L , in the sense that every (real) point of it 
strictly within a unit distance of some farm in L . Third, for any two farms in L  there exists 
a digital line segment between those farms (“the shortest path”) that belongs to L . 
 
PROPOSITION 6. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and the externality dissipation function 
is globally concave, 0)(2 ≤∆ dγ  for all ]2)1(,1[ −∈ nd . Then the set of generator 
locations *L :),{( ii yx=  },1* Nigi ∈∀=  is discretely convex in any PSNE. 
 
Because externality dissipates “slowly” with distance, the externality exposure for 
any recipient located “among” generators is greater than the average (distance-weighted) 
externality imposed by generators on each other. This implies that in equilibrium 
generators form a single neighborhood with “no holes.”26 The following example 
illustrates how the concavity of the externality-dissipation function leads to the discrete 
convexity of the equilibrium set of locations of generator farms. 
 
EXAMPLE 2. Assume a quadratic externality diffusion-decay function: 2)1(2)( −= ndγ  
2d− . By Lemma 1, PSNE where both crops are produced exists if +− 2)1(2 n ∑t ijd 2(  
)2jtd− 0* ≤tg  for all Nji ∈,  with 1* =ig , 0* =jg . Substituting for the Euclidean 
distances yields 22222 /)1(2 jjii yxyxsn −−++− xxx ji )(2 −+ 0)(2 ≤−+ yyy ji  for all 
Nji ∈,  with 1* =ig , 0* =jg , where x )/1( s= ∑t tt gx * , ∑= t tt gysy *)/1( , and s  
)( *gs G= . For convenience, relabel the coordinates in order to place the origin in the 
center of the region: let 2/)1( +−= nxx ioi , ioi yy = 2/)1( +− n  so that farm 
2/)1( 2 += no  has coordinates (0,0) if n  is odd. Consider a ball-shaped (symmetric) 
neighborhood of generators that is located in the center of the region as in Figure 4c. 
Then we have 0=x  and 0=y . And the condition for the existence of PSNE where both 
crops are produced reduces to 22 )()( oj
o
j yx + sn /)1(2 2−≥ 22 )()( oioi yx ++  for all ji,  
with 1* =ig , 0* =jg , that is, in equilibrium recipient farms are located “farther away” 
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from the center of the region than generator farms. An arrangement with 12)( * =gs  that 
satisfies the last condition and constitutes PSNE given that 146ˆ140 ≤≤ e  where 
)ˆ()ˆ( ee gr ππ =  is presented in Figure 4c. Note that the set of generator locations, *L , is 
discretely convex. 
 
4. Efficient Land-Use Arrangements and Compatibility  
with Nash Equilibrium 
In this section we take a policy perspective and look for spatial production patterns 
that maximize social welfare: 
 ),(),(max
,
grgr
QQ
QQCQQU
gr
− , (5) 
where gr QQ  ,  are the total outputs of recipient and generator crops. Here, U  is the social 
utility of consumption of both crops, 0/ >∂∂ rQU  and 0/ >∂∂ gQU , and C  is the 
minimum total cost of production given the size of the region and the technological and 
implementability-through-zoning-orders constraints: 
 ),(),(min),(
,,}{,}{ ii i
g
ii i
r
ppgr
gr egcercQQC
gr
NiiNii
∑∑ +=
∈∈
 subject to  (6) 
 (i) g
Ni i
r
Ni i
QgQr ≥≥ ∑∑ ∈∈   , ,  (“output quantity constraints”)  
 (ii) 0=ii rg , 0>+ ii rg  Ni∈∀  ,  (“zoning orders assign generator or recipient 
use”) 
 (iii) )},(,0{ * rii perr ∈ , )},(,0{ * gii pegg ∈ , (“farmers are noncooperative profit-
maximizers”) 
where ie  is the externality exposure given by (1), ),(
* r
i per  and ),(
* g
i peg  are the 
profit-maximizing output levels on farm i  - optimal solutions to (2). We assume that the 
participation constraints are met at the optimum: 0),( ≥rir peπ  and 0),( ≥gig peπ , and 
that it is socially optimal to produce both crops (e.g., gr QUQU ∂∂=∂∂ /)0(.,/,.)0(  ∞= ). 
The formulation of equation (6) implies that the social planner can assign land use to 
each farm but is able to control farm-level production activities only through output 
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prices, rp  and gp (common to all producers). In particular, constraints (ii) state that one 
(and only one) of the two crops is produced on each farm. In other words, because of a 
small scale of farming operations or other technological reasons, no farmer can (or, 
rather, has an incentive to) produce a mix of the two crops.27 Also implicit is the 
assumption that there exist no other (profitable) farm-level activities that neither generate 
nor bear externality. Constraint (iii) may arise as a result of high costs of monitoring and 
enforcing location-specific farm-level production and input-use intensities. Depending on 
the context, these may or may not be plausible assumptions. An unconstrained welfare-
maximization problem, where outputs of both crops are endogenous and vary across 
farms in each use, is not studied in this paper (however, see endnote 15).28 
 
ASSUMPTION 2. (i) 0/ >∂∂ ecr  (negative externality); (ii) 0/ =∂∂ ecg  (generators are 
externality-neutral). 
 
Condition (i) implies that 0/)( <∂∂ eerπ , so that the profit from growing recipient crop 
decreases with externality. Condition (ii) assures that generator profit, gπ , as well as 
profit-maximizing output, *g , is invariant to externality and, hence, to location. Under 
Assumption 2, upon incorporating constraints (i) - (iii), the joint maximization problems 
(5) and (6) can be restated more concisely as 
 ))((1),),(())(,1),((max *0
**
0
*
,}{,,
gg
gii
r
i
r
i
g
g
r
i
sgpp
pgscepercpsgperU
ii
Nii
gr
−− == ∑∑
∈
, (7) 
where }1,0{∈ig , ∑ =i i sg , and ∑ ≠= ij jijgi gdpge )()(* γ . Note that externalities ie  
enter both the benefit and cost components of the objective in (7). To simplify problem 
(7) we make the following assumption. 
 
ASSUMPTION 3. For any Niig ∈}{ , },0{
*ggi ∈ , the total farm-level profit-maximizing 
recipient output, R , and cost, rC , are both functions of the total externality damage, E : 
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0
* 1),( =∑ igri i per ),( rpER= and 0* 1)),,(( =∑ igiri ir eperc ),( rr pEC= , where 0/ ≤∂∂ ER , 
0/ >∂∂ rpR , 0/ ≥∂∂ EC r , 0/ >∂∂ rr pC , 01)( =∑= igi iefE , 0(.) >f , and 0/ >∂∂ ef . 
 
Assumption 3 adheres if (a) ))((),( efrcerc rr += , that is, externality damage amounts 
to the leftward shift of the farm-level cost function so that EppER rr −= )(),( ϕ  and 
),( rr pEC )( rpϕ= ; or (b) )(),( rcerc rr = )(ef+ , that is, the optimal output level is 
invariant to the extent of externality exposure ( 0/2 =∂∂∂ erc  and 0/ =∂∂ ER ) so that 
)(),( rr ppER ϕ=  and EppEC rrr += )(),( ϕ , where )(]/[1)( 10 rri gr prcp i −= ∂∂= ∑ϕ .  
Hence, problem (7) can be decomposed into two steps. First, we minimize the 
aggregate damages (profit losses), E  (or Epr ), given the number of farms in generating 
use, s , and output prices, rp  and gp :   
 EsE
Niig ∈
=
}{
* min)(  subject to }1,0{∈ig ,∑ ≥i i sg . (8) 
Then, based on the optimal arrangements of land uses in (8), output prices and the 
number of farms in generating use are optimally chosen. Note that generator and 
recipients outputs can be controlled by two instruments. Output prices affect farm-level 
production intensities, while zoning orders control the total number (and location) of 
farms in each use. We do not pursue the analysis of optimality of these two control 
measures any further but instead focus on problem (8) and characterize cost-minimizing 
arrangements. 
Observe that, under Assumptions 2 and 3, the objective in (8) can be equivalently 
posed as ),,( grr ppsΠ )),(()(max *
}{
rr
i i
r
g
psERpe
Nii
== ∑
∈
π )),(( * rr psEC− , so that 
minimizing the region-wide externality exposure, E , is equivalent to maximizing the 
total recipient profits, rΠ , conditional on rps, , and gp . The next two assumptions 
suffice to permit an analytical solution to (8). 
 
ASSUMPTION 4. The recipient’s profit decreases linearly with externality 22 / er ∂∂ π 0= . 
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If Assumption 2 holds (and hence, 0/ 22 =∂∂ ef 29), problem (8) is a well-known 
combinatorial problem that can be formulated as a graph partitioning problem, a specific 
instance of the quadratic assignment problem, or a quadratic optimization problem using 
graph-theoretic or matrix notation (Cela 1998; Burkard et al. 1998). This problem arises 
in a number of settings, including facility layout, manufacturing, circuit board and 
microchip design, parallel computing, and other numerous areas of engineering, physics, 
and management. The number of different arrangements with s  generator farms on a 
square nn ×  grid is )!(!/! 22 snsn − , so even for a small region, complete enumeration of 
all arrangements is infeasible. For example, there are more than 1029 possible 
arrangements for 1002 =n  farms and 50=s  generators. In general, the graph 
partitioning problem belongs to the class of problems for which the time required to 
check the optimality of a solution grows polynomially with the size of the problem. The 
variety of the suggested solution algorithms based on different approaches can be 
grouped into four categories: spectral and geometric methods, multilevel algorithms, 
discrete optimization-based methods, and continuous optimization-based methods (e.g., 
see Hager and Krylyuk 1999 and references therein).  
So, to characterize optimal arrangements in (8), we will also need the following 
assumption.  
 
ASSUMPTION 5. Externality impacts only neighbors with a common border: 11)( ≤= ddγ . 
 
We follow the approach suggested by Yackel, Meyer, and Christou (1997), which is 
based on the equivalence between the (constrained) optimal assignment problem (8) 
under Assumptions 4 and 5 and tiling the region so as to minimize the total tile perimeter, 
where each tile corresponds to the collection of farms in each use.30 Some consequences 
of relaxing Assumptions 4 and 5 are discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
4.1. Efficient Arrangements under a Negative Linear “Border” Externality  
In this section, we determine efficient arrangements (EA) under Assumptions 2 
through 5. For ease of reference, we restate problem (8) as follows: 
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Nnig
sE
∈
=
}{
* min)( ∑ ∑ ≤−i j jdi gg ij 11)1(   subject to }1,0{∈ig  and sgi i =∑ . (9) 
We will need the following result reported in Yackel, Meyer, and Christou 1997 and 
Rosenberg 1979. Let   }integer is ,:min{ zxzzx ≥=  and   xzzx ≤= :max{ , 
}integer is z . 
 
THEOREM A (Yackel, Meyer, and Christou 1997; Rosenberg 1979). The minimum 
perimeter of all configurations of s  cells, )(* sP , is given by 
        
 ≥+=
oherwise  ,4
 if ),(2
)(
2/1
2/12/12/12/1
*
s
sssss
sP . (10) 
 
Using Theorem A and formula (10), we state the following result (see Figure 5 for an 
illustration). 
 
PROPOSITION 7. Suppose that Assumptions 2 - 5 hold. For a given number of generators, 
s , EA consists of  
 (a) a minimum-perimeter neighborhood of generators that is tightly fitted in a corner 
of the region if 2/2ns ≤  and 2/)(* sP ]/[/1 nsnsn >+≤ ; 
 (b) (almost) rectangular neighborhoods of generators and recipients that share a 
border that is “almost” a row or a column if ≥− 2/]),(min[ 2* snsP ]/[/1 nsnsn >+ ; 
 
 
3=x
3=y  2=y
3=x  
Case (a), s=7 Case (c), s=30 Case (b), s=17
nx =
n  
n
n n  
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FIGURE 5. Optimal arrangements 
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 (c) a minimum-perimeter neighborhood of recipients that is tightly fitted in a corner 
of the region if 2/2ns ≥  and 2/)( 2* snP − ]/[/1 nsnsn >+≤ . 
The optimal amount of externality is given by ,2/]),(min[min[)( 2** snsPsE −=  
]1 ]/[/ nsnsn >+ . 
 
Proposition 7 is based on the observation (see Yackel, Meyer, and Christou 1997) 
that the quadratic assignment problem (9) can be reformulated as 
 nRGsE RG 4)()(min)( ,
* −Ρ+Ρ=  such that sG =|| , snR −= 2|| , NRG =∪ , (11)  
where )(GΡ  is the perimeter of a configuration of farms in set G  (only the borders that 
are shared with farms not in set G  are counted). Because the perimeter of the region’s 
boundary is fixed ( nN 4)( =Ρ ), minimizing the length of the border separating generators 
and recipients is equivalent to minimizing the total perimeter of both neighborhoods, or 
minimizing the length of the outer border that does not coincide with the region’s 
boundary for recipient (or generator) farms. In the proof of Proposition 7 it is shown that 
any EA must consist of recipient and generator neighborhoods with “filled” rows and 
columns. And so, in a square and symmetric region, there can be only three distinct forms 
of solution as illustrated in Figure 5.31 
A useful property of the square grid is that the length of the border separating 
recipients and generators in Cases (a) and (c) in Figure 5 is equal to yx +  when there are 
“no gaps” in row and columns in the two neighborhoods.32 Here, yx +  (both are positive 
integers) is the number of distinct rows and columns that intersect the neighborhood of 
generators (recipients) and contribute 1 to )(* sE . Arrangements in Figure 5 solve the 
following optimization problem: 
 


=+
<+=
> nyxn
nyxyx
sE
nsnsyx ],max[ if  ,1
],max[ if  ,
min)(
]/[/,
*  subject to ],min[ 2 sns − xy≤ . (12) 
If 7s =  as in Case (a), it is optimal to minimize the perimeter of the generator 
neighborhood. If 17s =  as in Case (b), it is optimal to set x n= , or y n=  in (12). Then, 
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clearly, the length of the border cannot be less than n  if s  can be expressed as kn  for 
some integer k , or 1n + , if otherwise. If 30s =  as in Case (c), it is optimal to minimize 
the perimeter of the recipient neighborhood. All EAs can be obtained by rotation and/or 
reflection of EAs in Cases (a) through (c). (There can be several EAs in Cases (a) and (c).) 
Note that when land surrounding the region is allocated to externality-generating use 
(as in Figure 2b), the search for EA is very simple. EA consists of any perimeter-optimal 
neighborhood of recipients located anywhere in the region, with the total amount of the 
externality born by recipients equal to )( 2* snP − . Next we ascertain when EAs may 
arise as a result of (or be “cheaply” implemented through) noncooperative behavior. 
4.2. When Are Efficient Arrangements Compatible with Nash Equilibrium? 
In this section, we investigate when EAs are self-enforcing, in the sense that (farm-
level) zoning restrictions, output and input prices (common to all producers), and per 
farm tax/subsidies conditional on land use constitute the Nash equilibrium.  
 
DEFINITION 2. The assignment of land uses gG  is self-enforcing in a noncooperative 
setting if there exists a crop-specific payment scheme (per farm tax or subsidy), rt  and 
gt , such that )(),( ggi
rr pep ππ > ),( jrr ept π>+  for each 0=ig  and 0>jg , where 
t = −gt rt  is a net positive or negative farm-level monetary transfer that depends on land 
use but not on farm location. 
 
Note that an arrangement can be self-enforcing if and only if the externality damage for 
any recipient is strictly less than the (avoided) damage for any generator, which is the 
necessary condition for the strict Nash equilibrium (see Lemma 1). 
Under Assumption 5, by Proposition 1, we can narrow our search for PSNE-
compatible EAs to those that are comprised of the rectangles of generators. Yackel, 
Meyer, and Christou (1997) provide the following theorem characterizing the rectangular 
blocks that have minimum perimeter among all arrangements with a given number of 
cells (farms). 
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THEOREM B (Yackel, Meyer, and Christou 1997). A rectangle yx ×  or xy ×  is 
perimeter-optimal if and only if  
   ]112),(2max[ 5.02/1 +−≤− yyroundyx  where xy ≤ . (13) 
Using this characterization of all perimeter-optimal rectangles (Theorem B), we state 
the following result. 
 
PROPOSITION 8. Let Assumptions 2–5 hold, nns −≤≤ 24 , and ),,(ˆ1 tppe gr< 2< , 
where tpep ggrr += )()ˆ,( ππ . Then an EA is self-enforcing (compatible with the strict 
PSNE) if and only if one of the following holds:  
 (i) 2/2ns < , ≤2/)(* sP ]/[/1 nsnsn >+ , and there exist integers x  and xy ≤  such that 
xys = , 2≥y , nx < , and condition (13) is satisfied.  
 (ii) ]/[/ nsns =  and ≥− 2/]),(min[ 2* snsP n . 
 
Proposition 8 provides precise conditions when it is possible that an efficient 
arrangement will emerge as a result of noncooperative profit-maximizing behavior. If 
condition (i) holds then ),(),(
* 1 yxyxi iig ≤=  for all Ni∈  is a self-enforcing EA (strict 
PSNE). If condition (ii) holds then siig ≤= 1*  for all Ni∈  is a self-enforcing EA (strict 
PSNE). Also, this result provides a sense in which it is “more likely” that EA is 
compatible with PSNE if the number of recipients exceeds the number of generators. In 
that case, EAs consist of (almost) rectangular blocks of generators, which, by Proposition 
1, coincide with one of the PSNE outcomes when condition (13) is satisfied. However, if 
there are sufficiently more generators than recipients and nsnP <− 2/)( 2* , efficiency 
requires that recipients be arranged in a (almost) rectangular block, which cannot occur in 
the strict Nash equilibrium (Case (c) in Figure 5). 
In the situations when land outside the region is permanently allocated to externality-
generating use (as illustrated in Figure 2b), it is easy to show that EA is compatible with 
PSNE if there exist integers x  and 2 y x≤ ≤  such that 2s n xy= −  and condition (13) is 
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satisfied. Thus, the range of circumstances when EAs are self-enforcing in the region with 
“unprotected edges” is broader compared with that in the region with “protected edges.”  
While a characterization in the manner of Proposition 7 of EA when externality has a 
local eight-farm neighborhood impact ( 2( ) 1ddγ ≤= ) is not attempted in this paper, it is 
easy to show that, in such cases, EA may or may not be compatible with PSNE as well. For 
example, a square neighborhood of four generators fitted in a corner of the region (see 
Part (iii) in Proposition 3 with ˆ2 3e≤ <  and 4s = ), and an octagon neighborhood of 
2 4n − generators (see Part (ii) in Proposition 3 with ˆ3 4e< <  and 2 4s n= − ), where 
4n ≥ , are EA and the strict PSNE for some output prices and per farm payments 
rt and gt .   
More generally, by Proposition 5, EA may be self-enforcing only if the desired 
number of generators, s , exceeds a lower bound. However, Proposition 8 demonstrates 
that without knowing the properties of the externality-dissipation function no “negative” 
universal statements regarding the compatibility of EA and PSNE are available. Next we 
examine some consequences of relaxing (one at a time) Assumptions 4 and 5.  
4.3. Efficient Arrangements under Non-Linear Profit Loss Due to Externality 
The property that in EA generators are located in a contiguous area with the minimum 
border length depends on Assumption 4—that returns to externality-receiving land use fall 
linearly with externality, e . The spatial concentration of generators may result in smaller 
on average but (possibly) more dispersed externality damages among the recipients. This is 
because a decrease in the total number of “border” neighbors with incompatible uses may 
necessitate locating the “bordering” recipients next to a greater number of generators.  
Observe that input adjustment at the farm level may assure that the marginal profit 
loss due to the externality decreases with a greater exposure. For example, suppose that 
the amount of productive acreage is reduced because of the buffer zone requirement. This 
is likely to result in a smaller-than-proportionate decline in farm income due to the 
optimal adjustment of the other farm inputs such as labor as the available acreage shrinks. 
However, it is not inconceivable that the reverse relationship holds when the externality 
enters the production function differently. For example, it may be increasingly difficult 
for a non-GM crop grower to coordinate planting activities to reduce the probability of 
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cross-pollination when there are more GM crop farmers in the surrounding area and 
buffer zones are not effective.33 
Let ))((),( efrcerc rr +=  so that ))(())()(()( rrrrr pcefppe ϕϕπ −−= , or 
)()(),( efrcerc rr +=  so that )()( rrr ppe ϕπ = ))(( rr pc ϕ− )(ef− , where )( rpϕ  
)(]/[ 1 rr prc −∂∂= . Suppose that 0/ 22 ≤∂∂ ef , which implies that the marginal recipient 
loss increases with the amount of exposure, 0/ 22 ≥∂∂ erπ . Then it may be optimal to let 
a smaller number of recipients bear most of the externality damage while lowering the 
damage for the remaining recipients. In contrast, suppose that 0/ 22 ≥∂∂ ef , and hence, 
0/ 22 ≤∂∂ erπ . Then it may not be socially optimal to expose some recipients to the 
damage from multiple externality generators. In some cases, a spatial spreading of 
generators across the region is liable to yield a more even distribution of the externality 
damages among recipients and improve efficiency. We will need the following measure 
of dispersion. 
 
DEFINITION 3. A vector ),...,( 1 nxxx =  is sub-majorized by the vector ),...,( 1 nyyy =  
(denoted by w≺ ) if ∑∑ == ≤ ki iki i yx 1 )(1 )(  for nk ,...,2,1= , where )()2()1( ... nxxx ≥≥≥  and 
)()2()1( ... nyyy ≥≥≥  are their components in non-increasing order.  
 
Note that wx y≺  can be equivalently stated as 1 ( )
n
ii f x=∑ 1 ( )n ii f y=≤∑  for all 
increasing convex functions f  (see Marshall and Olkin 1979 for details). The following 
result shows that if EA under Assumptions 2–5 is self-enforcing then it is also efficient (and 
of course, self-enforcing) if 2 2/ 0r eπ∂ ∂ ≤ . The reason is that the self-enforcement 
condition requires that each recipient be exposed to at most one unit of externality. 
Therefore, a self-enforcing EA under Assumptions 2–5 is characterized not only by the least 
number of exposed recipients but also by the least dispersion of exposures among them. 
 
COROLLARY 1. EA under Assumptions 2–5 is self-enforcing if and only if it is a self-
enforcing EA under Assumptions 2, 3, and 5, and 0/ 22 ≤∂∂ erπ . 
Equilibrium and Efficient Land-Use Arrangements under Spatial Externality on a Lattice / 31 
However, if 0/ 22 ≥∂∂ erπ  or EA under Assumptions 2–5 is not self-enforcing, EAs 
are affected by the curvature of the recipient’s profit function. The following result 
presents circumstances (“sufficient” convexity of )(erπ ) when an arrangement where 
generators (recipients) form a triangular neighborhood (illustrated in Figure 6a), 
dominates EA under Assumptions 2–5. We say that an arrangement is triangular if 
recipient farms that have one or two generator neighbors form a diagonal (discrete) line. 
Let 0),( =nsk  if 2/2ns >  and nsE =)(* , 1),( =nsk  if 2/2ns <  and the 
corresponding EA (Proposition 7) is self-enforcing, or 2/2ns >  and 1)(* += nsE , or 
2/2ns >  and nsE <)(*  and condition (13) is met for some integer x  and xy ≤≤2  
with xysn =−2 , and 2),( =nsk  if 2/2ns <  and EA (Proposition 7) is not self-
enforcing, or 2/2ns >  and nsE <)(*  and condition (13) is not met for any integer x  
and xy ≤≤2  with xysn =−2 , where )(* sE  is given by (9). Function ),( nsk  counts 
the number of recipients with two generator neighbors in EA under Assumptions 2–5 
plus one if there are recipients with one generator neighbor in the corresponding 
triangular arrangement (i.e., 2/2ns < ). 
 
COROLLARY 2. Suppose that 2/)1( += aas  or 2/)1(2 +−= aans  for some integer 
na <<2 . Then a triangular arrangement dominates EA under Assumptions 2–5 in the 
sense of social welfare if )),(/())(2(]/)0(/[]/)0([ *22 nskasEaee rr −−≥∂∂∂∂− ππ . 
 
Note that asE 2)(* <  when 2/)1( += aas  or 2/)1(2 +−= aans , na <<2 , so that a 
triangular arrangement may improve social welfare only if 0)0(2 >∆ rπ , and the index of  
 
 
 
(a) Triangular 
arrangement 
 
 
(b) EA under 
Assumptions 2-5 
 
 
(c) Disconnected 
generator areas 
 
 
(b) EA under 
Assumptions 2-5 
 )1(rπ  gπ  
 )0(rπ  )2(rπ  
FIGURE 6. Welfare-improving arrangements under non-linear recipient profit 
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“convexness” of the recipient’s profit in externality, ]/)0(/[]/)0([ 22 ee rr ∂∂∂∂− ππ , is 
sufficiently large. The following example illustrates. 
 
EXAMPLE 3. Suppose that Assumptions 2, 3, and 5 hold, 10=s , and 6=n . Consider 
arrangements in Figure 6a and 6b. Arrangement in Figure 6b is an EA under 
Assumptions 2–5. However, arrangement in Figure 6a improves the social welfare 
compared with that in Figure 6b if ]/)0(/[]/)0([ 22 ee rr ∂∂∂∂− ππ 2/1≥ . In arrangement 
(a), there are five exposed recipients, at the expense of a “double” exposure for three 
recipients, while in arrangement (b) the exposures among recipients are more “evened 
out,” at the expense of increasing the number of the exposed ones to six. 
 
It is clear that, under Assumptions 2, 3, and 5, and 0/ 22 ≥∂∂ erπ , any EA consists 
of at most one neighborhood of recipients and one neighborhood of generators. If an EA 
consisted of more than one neighborhood of farms with the same land use, then, by 
gluing the neighborhoods (see Yackel, Meyer, and Christou 1997), one could decrease 
the number of the exposed recipients without decreasing the measure of “unevenness” in 
the distribution of exposures among the remaining recipients (see Definition 3). On the 
other hand, an EA may consist of more than one neighborhood of generators if 
0/ 22 ≤∂∂ erπ  and none of the EAs under Assumptions 2–5 is self-enforcing. The 
following example illustrates.  
 
EXAMPLE 4. Suppose that Assumptions 2, 3, and 5 hold, and 7=s , and 6=n . Consider 
arrangements in Figures 6c and 6d. Arrangement in Figure 6d is EA under Assumption 4 
( 0/ 22 =∂∂ erπ ). However, arrangement in Figure 6c improves the social welfare 
compared with that in Figure 6d, if 0/)0(/)0( 22 <∂∂≤∂∂ ee rr ππ . In the arrangement in 
Figure 6(c), there are six recipients that are each exposed to one generator, while in the 
arrangement in Figure 6(d), there are five exposed recipients but one of them has two 
generator neighbors. When the recipient profit function is “sufficiently” concave, that is, 
]/)0(/[]/)0([ 22 ee rr ∂∂∂∂ ππ 1≥ , the benefits of a more “evened out” distribution of 
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damages outweigh the additional costs of exposing a greater number of recipients as in 
the case of arrangements in Figures 6(c) and 6(d).  
4.4. Efficient Arrangement under Global Spatial Externality  
The property, characterized in Proposition 7, that in EA generators are concentrated in 
a contiguous area also hinges on the restriction that the externality dissipates only across 
borders (Assumption 5). This is because the contiguity of the areas allocated to generator 
and recipient uses is a necessary condition for minimizing the total number of immediate 
“border” neighbors with incompatible uses. However, the externality may affect recipient 
farms located at greater distances (see Section 3.3). In such cases, optimal patterns may no 
longer involve the “agglomeration” of generators in one location even when Assumption 4 
is satisfied. The reason is that concentrating generators in a contiguous area may entail 
locating some generators “too close” to the center of the region. 
Suppose that Assumptions 2, 3, and 4 hold, and consider a linear externality-decay 
case: ddd −=)(γ , 2)1( −≥ nd . As illustrated in Figure 7, the concentration of 
generators may increase the number of exposed recipients and/or intensify the rate at 
which the externality reaches recipients by more than it minimizes the number of 
“maximally” exposed recipients. Note that in the EA in Figure 7b, generators are not 
located in a contiguous area (do not form a neighborhood). In EA (b), disconnected farms 
1 and 3 are generators because, compared with a suboptimal arrangement in Figure 7(a), 
even though the exposure for recipient farm 2 in arrangement (b), )1(22 −= de , is 
greater than that for recipient farm 3 in Figure 7a, )1(23 −= de 1− , the other recipients 
“gain” by distancing themselves (on average) from the sources of externality. In other 
words, generator farms 1 and 3 are located “on average” farther away from the other 
(recipient) farms in arrangement in Figure 7b compared with the “average” distance 
between generator farms 1 and 2 and recipients in arrangement in Figure 7a.  
 
(a) 
 
, 02.257)2( −= dE   (b) 
 
, 43.257)2(* −= dE  
FIGURE 7. Inefficient (a) and efficient (b) arrangements: ddd −=)(γ , 3=n , 
22≥d  
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5. Conclusions 
This paper takes a close look at the equilibrium and efficient arrangements of 
activities (conflicting and non-conflicting land uses) that generate and receive a distance-
dependent negative externality. Similar land uses are non-conflicting (compatible) in the 
sense that the incremental return from switching land uses increases with the externality 
given by the distance-weighted output of neighbors with the same land use. Then the pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium is characterized by a simple condition that the amount of 
externality exposure for each farm in the externality-receiving land use cannot be greater 
than that for each farm in the externality-generating use. To improve the efficiency of an 
arrangement, the social planner can assign land uses through zoning restrictions and 
manipulate production intensities through output prices. The compatibility of the 
(constrained) efficient arrangements with Nash equilibrium depends on how an 
externality dissipates with distance, the desired number of generators, and the curvature 
of the recipient’s profit function. A main policy implication is that there exist 
circumstances when an (constrained) efficient arrangement can be implemented through 
self-enforcing zoning orders, which obviates the need for the investment in subsequent 
monitoring or enforcement. However, in other situations such zoning orders may conflict 
with profit-maximizing objectives of individual (noncooperative) land owners. And so, a 
policymaker may face a potential trade-off between the gain in efficiency and the cost of 
implementing a particular land-use arrangement. 
There are a number of restrictive assumptions implicit in the formulation of the 
model and the “constrained” efficiency problem, such as perfect information among the 
agents, the observability of the production activities in the entire region, and the lack of 
countermeasures to combat the effects of the externality (e.g., pollution abatement) on the 
part of generators. Also, the limitation of (profitable) production activities to be either 
externality generating or externality receiving may be an implausible assumption. For 
example, agricultural land enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program and retired from 
production may also serve as a buffer (or barrier) zone to prevent externality exposure 
(Munro 2003). From the producers’ perspective, an externality-neutral activity amounts 
to “convexifying” the profit from recipient land use as it effectively puts a cap on the 
incurred damage from the externality.  
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The temporal dimension of the activity choice and, as a consequence, the fixed costs 
that are frequently associated with land-use change, as well as the uncertainty of the 
future income flow contingent on the surrounding land uses, are completely left out of the 
model. Dispensing with these and other assumptions regarding the participants’ behavior 
is likely to glean valuable insights into the problem of improving the efficiency of the 
arrangement of land uses under spatial externality. It is also worth noting that the issue of 
the spatial arrangement of conflicting or benefiting activities is not confined to crop 
agriculture and is pertinent in other areas of economics such as urban economics and 
social sciences (e.g., Brock and Durlauf 2001).
  
Endnotes 
1. In 2001, a conference in Minneapolis titled “Strategies for the Coexistence of GMO, 
Non-GMO, and Organic Crop Production” was attended by GMO, non-GMO, and 
organic producers; specialists from the USDA; academic researchers; and represen-
tatives from biotechnology companies. One of the primary issues on the agenda was 
the development of strategies for the coexistence of potentially incompatible 
farming practices, including “neighbor relations” (the meeting’s agenda and 
summary are available at http://www.biotech.iastate.edu/publictions/IFAFS/ 
coexistence.html). Public interest in this issue is also exemplified by the grants 
awarded by the National Science Foundation to research the unintended spread of 
engineered plant genes (Feedstuffs 2004a, p. 15).  
 
2. In the data sample of California growers used in their study, the certification as an 
organic producer is a substantial economic decision. To use the “organic” label for 
crops produced on land that was not previously certified, a farm is required to 
undergo a three-year transition period with annual inspections, during which organic 
production practices are followed. 
 
3. See USDA n.d. for more information on organic farming and Riddle 2004 for a 
recommendation of strategies for organic and conventional growers to minimize 
genetic drift, commingling, and other GMO contamination. An account of the latest 
research results on corn pollen drift and the effectiveness of buffer strips planted to 
corn is reported in Feedstuffs 2004b, p. 15.  
 
4. Also, there may be increases in the cost of production or yield losses attributed to 
the conflicting pest management approaches used by organic and conventional 
growers, and the severity of such problems is greatest along borders between organic 
and conventional farms (Parker and Munro 2004). 
 
5. Also, the presence of externalities that extend across borders between land uses 
plays a role in the analysis of optimal management decisions in the case of tropical 
forests in Albers 1996. 
 
6. Of course, nothing changes if there is a large pool of homogenous farm operators 
with a fixed reservation wage who competitively bid for land rent. 
 
7. We use the terms “generator” and “recipient” following the agent-based simulation 
literature (Parker and Meretsky 2004). A function is called “supermodular” if 
increasing one variable increases the incremental return to another variable. This 
concept is immediately related to the important economic notion of complementarity 
(e.g., Topkis 1998). 
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8. We also report certain properties of equilibrium land-use arrangements and provide 
a discussion of efficient arrangements when Assumptions 4 and 5 are relaxed. 
 
9. The timing of moves (simultaneous or sequential), including incentive-based 
asynchronous updating in agent-based models, is known to qualitatively alter both 
dynamics and end states (e.g., Huberman and Glance 1993; Page 1997). In addition, 
the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes may not coincide with agent-based learning 
simulation models such as the local adjustment and experience-based models used in 
Laine and Busemeyer 2004.  
 
10. In fact, it was first introduced by economists Koopmans and Beckman (1957) in the 
context of a plant location problem. 
 
11. It is impossible in the strict Nash equilibrium where no agent is indifferent between 
her equilibrium action and some other action, given the other agents’ actions. 
 
12. Also, Belcher, Nolan, and Phillips (2003) use a cellular automata simulation 
program known as the game of life to study a dynamic process of contamination and 
decontamination in the case of GMO and non-GMO crops. They find that under 
certain initial distributions of crops there exist stable equilibria where both crops are 
produced. Munro (2003) assigns a fixed number of externality generating uses in a 
random manner and determines an upper and lower bound on the total externality 
damage imposed on the recipients. Spatial externality considered in both studies 
corresponds to Case (b), analyzed in Section 3.2, where the externality imposed by a 
GMO grower affects at most eight non-GMO growers located in the adjacent cells. 
In addition, an extension of Parker 2000 is presented in Parker and Meretsky 2004, 
where a simulation model of parcel managers under conflicts between urban and 
agricultural uses is developed. 
 
13. There is a rich literature on city formation where externalities drive spatial 
agglomeration and specialization (e.g., Fujita and Thisse 2002; and Berliant, Peng, 
and Wang 2002). 
 
14. Also, Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) develop a very rich framework to analyze 
an endogenous formation of the city structure under spatial externality. They 
consider atomless firms that become more productive as the amount of production 
activity in their proximity increases with the impact of a unit increase in nearby 
production activity restricted to decay exponentially with its distance from the target 
firm. While in Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg firms balance the benefits from locating in 
high-employment density areas against the costs of longer commutes for workers, in 
our set-up there is only one type of agent and one force behind the heterogeneity in 
equilibrium land-use across agents. Our analysis is much simpler because equilib-
rium is characterized by a single condition that the exposure to the externality by 
any farm in the externality-receiving use be smaller than that for any farm in the 
externality-generating use. This condition is the sole determinant of the geometric 
properties of equilibrium arrangements analyzed in the paper. 
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15. Heterogeneity in farm size, land quality, or other production characteristics can be 
accommodated by allowing for asymmetry in the externality impacts in multiplica-
tive or additive form as follows: ( )ij ijd h+γ  or ( )ij ijd hγ . Furthermore, suppose that 
ij i jh a b= +  or ij i jh a b= . In that case, ia  can be interpreted as farm i’s susceptibility 
to externality and bj as farm j’s generating capacity. Equilibrium and efficient 
arrangements under the assumption of heterogeneous farms (but in the absence of 
spatial structure, i.e., ( )d k=γ  for all d ) are easy to obtain and are not reported in 
this paper because of space constraints.  
 
16. Equivalently, in terms of spatial weight matrices used in spatial econometrics (e.g., 
Anselin, Florax, and Rey 2004), externality exposures are given by e Wg=G G , where 
21{ ,..., }ne e e=
G  is a vector of externality exposures, { }ijW w=  is the distance-
weighting matrix with 0iiw =  and ( )ij ijw d= γ  for each ,   ,i j i j N≠ ∈ , and 
21( ,..., )ng g g=
G  is a vector of generator crop outputs on each farm. Also, note the 
analogy with the expected form of the utility function over lotteries. Expression (1) 
for the externality damage can be derived from “preferences” over the distribution of 
land uses in the region if the “preferences” satisfy continuity and independence 
axioms. The independence axiom amounts to requiring that the impact of any 
generator farm on the recipient farm is independent of the impact of the other 
generator farms. 
 
17. See Parker 2000 for a discussion of “unprotected” and “protected” borders in Case 
(a). The arbitrariness of assuming that land surrounding the region is in externality-
generating use is particularly apparent in Case (c), since the distribution of the 
exogenous externality exposures across the region will then depend on the distribu-
tion of land uses outside the region. 
 
18. A game is called “supermodular” if each player’s objective function is supermodular 
in the player’s own actions and actions of all other players. In other words, in a 
supermodular game, a “higher” equilibrium action by any player leads to an optimal 
equilibrium choice of “higher” actions by all other players.  
 
19. This seems particularly realistic given the three-year transition period required to 
obtain an organic grower status. However, in other cases of interest, mixed strategies 
may be implemented through crop rotation beneficial in its own right. 
 
20. The assumption that the lattice is square is important because neighborhoods of 
farms with compatible (similar) land use are formed in any equilibrium where both 
crops are produced. For example, if the lattice is one-dimensional so that | |ijd i j= −  
for any ,i j N∈ , it can be shown that the only PSNE are * (0,...,0)g =G  or 
* (1,...,1)g =G for any externality-dissipation function (.)γ .  
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21. A set of farms G N⊂  is a 4 (8)-connected neighborhood, if for any ,i j G∈  there is 
a sequence of neighbors that share a common border (border or corner) in the set, 
1,..., kf f G∈ , such that 1, 1( 2)t tf fd + ≤  for 1,... 1t k= − , 1f i=  and kf j= . Unless 
specified otherwise, a “neighborhood” will refer to a 4-connected neighborhood.  
 
22. These kinds of land-use patterns are obtained in Parker 2000 using a simulation 
approach in the case of “protected” borders. 
 
23. These kinds of patterns are obtained in Parker 2000 using a simulation approach in 
the case of “unprotected” borders. 
 
24. Function ( )round x  rounds x  to the nearest integer. 
 
25. The convex hull of L  is ( ) {( , ) | ( , )Co L x y x y= =  ( , )  ( )t t t t tt x y x , y∀∑ α  
  0, 1}t ttL∈ ∀ ≥ =∑α α , i.e., the intersection of all (real) convex sets that contain 
L , or equivalently, “the smallest” convex set containing L . 
 
26. This result can be easily generalized when there are multiple activities or multiple 
levels for an activity. Suppose that agents are located on a lattice and play a 
supermodular game with payoff functions of the form ( , )i i ij jj if g d g≠= ∑π , where 
g∈ℜ  and (.,.)f  is supermodular (see Milgrom and Roberts 1990). Then, in the 
manner of Proposition 6, it can be shown that the Nash equilibrium profile 
2*
1{ ( , ) }
n
i i i ig x y g ==  is a quasi-convex function on a lattice. 
 
27. One way to assure this is to set (0)γ  (a self-imposed “externality”) to equal some 
large number. 
 
28. Formally, this amounts to removing constraints (ii) and (iii) in (6). Real-world 
examples are agreements between organic and conventional growers where 
conventional growers alter production practices or farming intensities so as to 
accommodate the needs of organic producers. Abatement measures also exist in the 
case of conflicts between livestock operations and residential properties due to 
odors.  
 
29. Note that 2 2( ) /r e e∂ ∂π 2( ) /r r rre rr eec c c= − 2 * 2( ( , ), ) /r rc r e p e e= −∂ ∂ , where subscripts 
denote the second-order derivatives of ( , )rc r e  (cost minimization only implies that 
0rrrc ≥ ). 
 
30. The main application discussed in Yackel, Meyer, and Christou 1997 is partitioning 
multiple tasks among processors so as to minimize interprocessor communication. 
Because their interest is in the situations when the number of different tasks 
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(conflicting or distinct land uses) is large, they do not consider a special case with 
just two different tasks that is of primary interest in this paper. 
 
31. A configuration with farms along all four of the region’s boundaries cannot possibly 
be optimal since there must be a row (or a column) that contributes 2, which 
contradicts the necessary condition for optimality. 
 
32. Note that the perimeter of the generator (recipient) neighborhood in Cases (a) and 
(c) is also equal to 2 (( ,0),(0, ))M x y , where 1 1 2 2(( , ), ( , ))M x y x y 1 2| |x x= −  
1 2| |y y+ −  is “Manhattan” or city-block distance. 
 
33. As mentioned in the introduction, Helfand and Rubin (1994) identify a number of 
“technical” and “psychological” sources of nonlinearities in social welfare, 
environmental quality, and cost functions. They also discuss different circumstances 
that may lead to optimal spatial concentration or spreading of generated externality 
but in a setting with just two production sites. When the landscape consists of 
multiple sites, a more careful analysis of optimal location of externality-generating 
activity is needed. 
 
34. This procedure follows the “partial square” construction described in Yackel, 
Meyer, and Christou 1997. The authors establish that the arrangements of farms that 
are square or nearly square (height and width differ by at most one) have a minimum 
perimeter among all arrangements with a given number of farms. They also 
demonstrate a procedure that can be used to construct all possible minimum-
perimeter configurations for a given number of generators s . 
  
Appendix 
Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Part (i). If eˆ2 <  then, by Assumption 1, )()( ee gr ππ >  for }2,1,0{∈e  and farms 
located in the corners of the region must be recipients because 2)( =≤ ∑ ≠kj kjk de γ  and 
)()( k
g
k
r ee ππ >  for 22 ,1,,1 nnnnk +−= . But this implies that any farms located in the 
cells adjacent to the corners must be recipients because we also have 2≤ke  for 
{=k ,2 ,1 ,1 ,2 nnn −+  nn 22 − 1+ , nnnnn −−+− 222  ,1 ,2 }. But the farms adjacent to 
these cells may have at most two neighbors that are generators and thus must be 
recipients as well. Continuing in this manner, it follows that all farms must be recipients 
in the PSNE.  
Part (ii). Observe that 2ˆ1 << e  implies that )()( ee rg ππ <  for }1,0{∈e  and )(erπ  
)(egπ<  for }4,3,2{∈e . Hence, in any PSNE where both crops are produced, each 
recipient has at most one generator neighbor while each generator has at least two 
generator neighbors: (a) 1* ≤ie  if 0* =ig , and (b) 2* ≥ie  if 1* =ig . Suppose that there is 
a generator neighborhood that is not a rectangle with dimensions (the height and width of 
the smallest rectangle that contains the neighborhood) not less than 2 by 2. If one of the 
dimensions is equal to one then there are (two) generators (one at each end) in the 
generator neighborhood that have only one generator neighbor each. And so, condition 
(a) is violated. Otherwise, there exists a recipient that has two generator neighbors, which 
violates condition (b).  
Part (iii). Clearly, if 0* =∑i ig  then )0()0( grri πππ ≥=  so that 0* =ig  for all i  is 
the PSNE. If 2* ng
i i
=∑  then 2≥ie  and )()( igir ee ππ <  for all i , hence, 1* =ig  for all 
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i  is the PSNE. If 2*0 ng
i i
<< ∑  then there exists a recipient i  that has at least one 
generator neighbor. But this is impossible because, by assumption, )()( ee gr ππ <  for any 
1≥e . 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Part (i). If eˆ4 <  then )()( ee gr ππ >  for any }4,...,0{∈e . Then farms located in the 
corners of the region must be recipients because 3≤ie  for },1,,1{ 22 nnnni +−= . But 
then farms adjacent to the corner farms and located on the edge of the region, {=i 2, 
n+1, n-1, 2n, n2-2n+1, },1,2 222 nnnnn −−+− , have at most four neighbors that can be 
generators. And so, they must be recipients as well. The same is true for all of the 
remaining edge cells, ,...,3 ,1)3(,...,12 ,2,...,3 nnnnni +−+−=  nn )3( − , 
2,...,3)1( 2 −+− nnn . Next, remove the (recipient) edge cells of the region and apply the 
same reasoning to the remaining cells. Continue in this manner until the region consists 
of the one cell ]2/[ 2ni = 1+  when n  is odd or the four adjacent cells in the middle, 
2/)1{( nni −= ,  nnnnn +−+− 2/)1(,12/)1( , }12/)1( ++− nnn , when n is even. 
Hence, all farms must be recipients. 
Part (ii). If 4ˆ3 << e  then )()( ee gr ππ >  for }3,...,0{∈e  and )()( ee gr ππ <  for 
}8,...,4{∈e . Hence, in any PSNE where both crops are produced, (a) 3≤ie  for each 
0* =ig , and (b) 4≥ie  for each 1* =ig . It is clear that any octagon-shaped neighborhood 
consisting of 12 or more generators (with two or more generators along each side) 
satisfies conditions (a) and (b). Also, observe that only borders of generator 
neighborhoods that are formed by diagonal, vertical, or horizontal lines do not violate 
condition (a). However, in a neighborhood formed by the intersection of vertical and 
horizontal lines there exists a generator who has at most three other generator neighbors, 
which violates condition (b). Therefore, each generator neighborhood must have obtuse 
corners formed by the intersection of diagonal and vertical or diagonal and horizontal lines.  
Part (iii). If 3ˆ2 <≤ e , it follows that (a) 2≤ie  for each 0* =ig , and (b) 2≥ie  for 
each 1* =ig . Hence, the dimensions (height and width of the smallest rectangle that 
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contains the neighborhood) of any neighborhood of generators cannot exceed two if 
condition (a) holds. On the other hand, the dimensions of any neighborhood of generators 
cannot be less than two if condition (b) holds. Therefore, generators must be arranged in 
square neighborhoods of exactly four generators, if 0)( * ≠gs G  or 2n . 
Part (iv). Clearly, if 0* =∑i ig  then )0()0( grri πππ ≥=  so that 0* =ig  for all i  is 
the PSNE. If 2* ng
i i
=∑  then 3≥ie  for each i . But, by assumption, )()( ee rg ππ ≥  for 
any }8,...,2{∈e , so that 1* =ig  for all i  is the PSNE. If )1()1( gr ππ <  then 
2*0 ng
i i
<< ∑  is clearly impossible. So assume that ≤)1(gπ )1(rπ  and )2()2( gr ππ < . 
If 2*0 ng
i i
<< ∑  then there must exist a recipient i  with )1()1( grri πππ ≥=  that has at 
least one generator neighbor j  with 2≤ijd . Then all farms in the eight-neighborhood 
of generator j  must be recipients (to assure that )1(rrk ππ = )1(gπ≥  for all farms k  with 
2≤kjd  including farm i ). Then we have je  0= , but this is impossible because farm j  
is generator with 2≥je . 
Proof of Proposition 5 
In any PSNE with 11 2 −≤≤ ns , there must exist farm i  with 0* =ig  and farm j  
with 1* =jg  such that 1=ijd . From the necessary equilibrium condition it follows that 
jtjt jtijtjt iti
egddgde =≤+= ∑∑ ≠≠ ** )()()( γγγ . Rearranging this inequality yields 
*)]()([)1( titjt jt gdd γγγ −≤ ∑ ≠ ∑ ≠≤ jt jtd )([γ *)]1( tjt gd +− γ  )ˆ()1( ds γ∆−−≤ , where 
)()1()( ddd γγγ −+=∆ , 1ˆ =d  if 02 ≥∆ γ  and 2)1(ˆ −= nd  if 02 ≤∆ γ . The second 
inequality follows because 1=ijd  implies that 1|| ≤− itjt dd  for any Nt∈  and 0≤∆γ . 
The third inequality uses the curvature of function γ  to obtain an upper bound on the 
difference )(dγ∆  for )2)1(,1[ −∈ nd . 
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Proof of Proposition 6  
There are two steps. First, we prove that the convex hull of *L  contains no recipients. 
Then we show that *L  is a connected neighborhood.  
Step 1. Let }1,0  ),(|),{()( *** =≥∀= ∑∑ ii iiiiii i ggyxyxLCo δδδ  denote the convex 
hull of the set of generator farms. Prove by contradiction. Suppose that 0* =ig  and 
),( ii yx  )(
*LCo∈ . By definition, we have *),(),( kk kkkii gyxyx ∑= α  for some 0≥kα  
and 1* =∑ kk k gα . Then externality received by farm i  is ie ∑ ≠= ij jij gd *)(γ  
∑ ≠= ij jjjii gyxyxd *)),(),,(((γ ∑ ∑≠= ij jjjkk kkk gyxgyxd ** )),(,),((( αγ  
∑ ∑≠≥ ij jkjjk kkk ggyxyxd ** ))),(,),((( αγ ∑ ∑≥ j jkjjk kkk ggyxyxd **)),(,),(((γα  
)]0()),(),,((([ ** γγα∑ ∑ += ≠k kj jjjkkkk gyxyxdg mk kkk eeg >+= ∑ )0(* γα , where 
}0|{min * >= kkkkm gee α  and )),(),,(( jjii yxyxd ijd= . The first and second inequalities 
follow from convexity of )),(),,(( jjii yxyxd  and concavity of )(dγ , respectively. The 
last equality and inequality follow because 1* =∑k kk gα  and 0)0( ≥γ , respectively. But 
this cannot be in the Nash equilibrium if Assumption 1(a) holds. 
Step 2. To complete the proof we need to show that *L  is an eight-connected 
neighborhood. By Step 1, )( *LCo *L=  (i.e., only farms in *L  belong to the convex hull of 
*L ). It is not hard to demonstrate that each farm in (any isolated neighborhood of) *L  
must have at least three generator neighbors that are mutual border or corner neighbors 
(i.e., four of them form a 2× 2 square) when )(dγ  is concave ( 3>n ). This can be 
checked using a simple test function ],min[)( ddkdk −=γ  for any 0>k , where 
2)1( −≥ nd , since any decreasing concave function can be obtained as a linear 
combination of kγ . But if any neighborhood of *L  has a thickness of at least two at every 
cell (every generator belongs to some 2× 2 square of other generators), then )( *LCo  can 
be shown to be connected (see Chaudhuri and Rosenfeld 1998 for details). 
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Proof of Proposition 7  
The proof proceeds in two steps. In Step 1, we develop a tight lower bound for 
)(* sE . In Step 2, we use Theorem A to find arrangements that achieve the lower bound.  
Step 1. Note that a generator farm imposes a cost on a recipient farm if and only if 
they share a common border. Consequently, it is always possible to arrange generators 
and recipients so that each row and column of the region contributes at most 1 to )(* sE . 
However, the total length of the border separating sn −2  recipients from s  generators 
cannot be less than the minimum number of rows and columns of the region that contain 
both types of farms. Equivalently, the total border cannot be less than the total number of 
rows and columns ( n2 ) minus the maximum number of rows and columns that contain 
only one type of farms.  
And so, the lower bound is given by ( x  and y  are non-negative integers) 
  

=−+
<<+≥
nyxntyx
nynxyx
sE
yx ],max[ if ,/
, if ,
min)(
,
 (A.1) 
 subject to xyt ≤ , ],min[ 2 snst −= . 
An equivalent formulation of the lower bound uses the maximum number of rows and 
columns that contribute 0 to *( )E s  given that there are s  generator and 2n s−  recipient 
farms in the region:  
  
,
,  if 0, 0
( ) 2 max
/ ,  if 0r c
x y x y
E s n
x y n t n xy
+ > >≥ −  + + − =  
 (A.2) 
  subject to t nx ny ry≥ + − , 2max[ , ]t s n s= − . 
The second line in (A.2) states that, given that all rows (columns) contain both types of 
farms ( 0y =  or 0x = ), that the number of columns (rows) that contain only one type of 
farm cannot be greater than 1n −  if / [ / ]s n s n≠  or n , otherwise. Note that nx ny xy+ −  
(see the constraint in [A.2]) is the number of farms (generators) in the rows and columns 
that contribute 0 to *( )E s . It is straightforward to check the equivalence between (A.1) 
and (A.2). Formulation (A.1) is used in Step 2. 
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The objective function in the minimization problem in (A.1) is the shortest possible 
length of the border separating generators and recipients. It is equal to the smallest 
number of rows and columns that contribute 1 (contain both types of farms and exactly 
one border shared by farms of different types) given that farms in all other rows and 
columns are all of the same type and therefore contribute 0. The second line in (A.1) 
states that, given that all rows (columns) contain both types of farms, the number of 
columns (rows) that contain both types of farms cannot be less than 1  if ]/[/ nsns ≠  (or 
0 , otherwise). This is obvious and easy to show by contradiction. Note that the number 
of farms in any set that is intersected by y  distinct rows and x  columns cannot exceed 
xy  (hence, the constraint in [A.1]).  
Step 2. The non-linearity in (A.1) indicates that there are two distinct candidate 
arrangements that may achieve the lower bound. (i) An arrangement G  of ],min[ 2 sns −  
farms that minimizes the sum of rows and columns where each row and column 
contributes exactly 1 to )(* sE . (ii)  An arrangement G  that maximizes the number of 
rows (or columns) that contribute zero to )(* sE  given that each column (or each row) of 
G  contributes at most 1 to )(* sE . Case (ii) adheres when it is optimal to set 
nyx =],max[  in (A.1). Otherwise, an arrangement in Case (i) assures that (A.1) holds 
with equality. 
Next, we determine what constitutes optimal arrangements in Case (i). By Theorem 
A, a rectangle with the sides of length  2/1t , or  2/1t  and  2/1t , has the minimum 
perimeter (the smallest number of rows and columns). Remove   tt / −221  (or 
   ttt / −2/121 ) cells from an outer row or column of the rectangle starting with a corner 
cell (a cell that has two border neighbors from outside the neighborhood).34 The resultant 
configuration of s  farms has no gaps in rows or columns and “straight” sides. Hence, by 
fitting this arrangement in a corner of the square region (note that the “length” of each 
side is less than n  since   nt <2/1 ), we obtain an arrangement of t  cells with the 
minimum number of rows and columns each contributing exactly 1 to )(* sE , so that, by 
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Theorem A, 2/)()( ** tPsE ≤ . Note that because )(* sP  increases with s , we have 
2/)()( ** sPsE ≤   if 2/2ns ≤  and )(* sE  2/)( 2* snP −≤  if otherwise.  
In Case (ii), because the region is square and symmetric, without loss of generality, 
let }:{ siiG ≤= , so that ]1,min[)(* +≤ snsE  if ]/[/ nsns =  and 1],min[)(* +≤ snsE  
if otherwise. Hence, the constructed arrangements in Cases (i) or Case (ii) achieve the 
lower bound depending on whether nyx
txyyx
)(min
}:,{
≥≤+≤  ]/[/1 nsns >+ . Using the formula 
for minimum-perimeter arrangements in Theorem A to calculate the value of the 
minimization problem in (A.1), we obtain ]),(min[min[)( 2** snsPsE −=  
,2/ ]1 ]/[/ nsnsn >+ . 
Proof of Proposition 8 
Part (i). Consider a candidate arrangement ),(),(
* 1 yxyxi iig ≤=  for all Ni∈  . By 
Proposition 1(ii), this arrangement constitutes strict PSNE when 2ˆ1 << e . On the other 
hand, by Theorem B we have yxsP +=2/)(* . Therefore, this arrangement is EA 
because, by assumption, ≤2/)(* sP ]/[/1 nsnsn >+  and 2/2ns <  (see Case (i) of 
Proposition 7). 
Part (ii). Consider a candidate arrangement siig ≤= 1*  for all Ni∈ . By Proposition 
1(ii), this arrangement is strict PSNE when it forms a rectangle of generators, i.e., 
]/[/ nsns =  and 2ˆ1 << e . By Proposition 7, Case (ii), the proposed arrangement is also 
EA because, by assumption, ≥− ]),(min[ 2* snsP n . 
Proof of Corollary 1  
Let Ni
e
ig ∈}{  denote a self-enforcing EA, and let ∑ ≠ ≤= ij ejdei ge ij 11  represent 
externality exposures associated with it. Then for any iig }{ ′  where }1,0{∈′ig  and 
sg
i i
=′∑ , we have ∑∑ == ′≤ ki iki ei zz 1 )(1 )(  for 21 nk ≤≤ , where )1( eieiei gez −=  and 
)1( iii gez ′−′=′  and ene zz )()1( 2... ≥≥  and )()1( 2... nzz ′≥≥′ . This follows because, by 
Proposition 7, we have ∑∑ == ′≤ 22 11 ni ini ei zz , and by Proposition 8, }1,0{∈eiz  for all Ni∈ , 
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so a self-enforcing EA has the least possible amount of dispersion compared with any 
sequence of 2n  non-negative integers that sum to )(* sE ∑== 21ni eiz . Therefore, by 
Definition 3, we have wNi
e
i
e
i ge ≺∈− )}1({ Niii ge ∈′−′ )}1({ . Because ∑= i iefsE )()(  
)1( ig−  and, by assumption, f  is an increasing and convex function, the result follows. 
Proof of Corollary 2 
If 2/)1( += aas , in a triangular arrangement, we have )(sE t  )1( −= a )2(f  
)1(2 f+ )0)(1( 2 +−−+ asn . If 2/)1(2 +−= aans , in a triangular arrangement, we 
have )2()( afsE t = )0()( 2 fasn −−+ . The result is obtained by comparing )(sE t  with 
)(sE ∑ ∑∈ ≠ ≤ −= Ni eiij ejd ggf ij )1)(1( 1 , where Nieig ∈}{  is the assignment of generators in 
EA under Assumptions 2–5, and observing that, in EA under Assumptions 2–5, the 
number of recipients with two generator neighbors is at most one if 2/2ns ≤  or two if 
nsE <)(*  and 2/2ns > . 
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